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Supervisors individually liable
Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act
By Tory L. Lucas*
Until recently, the
Iowa Supreme Court
had never squarely
decided whether a
supervisory employee
could be subjected to
individual liability for
employment discrimination under the
Iowa Civil Rights Act
Tory L. Lucas
of 1965. On 13
October 1999, the Court definitively
ruled in Vivian v. Madison “that the
Iowa Civil Rights Act does authorize the
subjecting of a supervisory employee to
individual liability.”1
In Vivian, Wendy Vivian filed a
multi-count complaint in federal court
against her employer, United Parcel
Service, and her supervisor, Gerry
Madison, alleging racial and sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII of
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the Civil Rights Act of 19642 (Title VII)
and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 19653
(ICRA).4 Defendant Madison moved to
dismiss the complaint against him on
the ground that supervisory employees
could not be held individually liable
under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.5 After
noting that the federal courts in Iowa
were split over the issue of supervisor liability under the ICRA and without
unqualified precedent from the Iowa
Supreme Court on which to base its
decision, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
Judge Ronald E. Longstaff, certified the
following question to the Iowa Supreme
Court: “Is a supervisory employee subject to individual liability for unfair
employment practices under Iowa Code
section 216.6(1) of the Iowa Civil
Rights Act?”6
The Court gave a clear yes to
the certified question. In determining
that supervisory employees are subject
to individual liability for unfair employment practices under the ICRA, the
Iowa Supreme Court simply read and
applied the statute’s plain language.
In reaching its holding, the Court
distinguished the ICRA from Title VII,
the legislation upon which the ICRA
was modeled.7
The Plain Language
The Iowa Supreme Court and the
federal courts in Iowa have consistently
analyzed the ICRA against the backdrop
of federal law.8 When the debate turned
to whether supervisors can be individually liable under the ICRA, however,
federal law provided an unnecessary
impediment as opposed to analytical
guidance. As the Iowa Supreme Court
stated in Vivian, Title VII “differs from
the ICRA in several key respects.”9
Iowa Code section 216.6(1)(a), entitled Unfair Employment Practices, makes it
“an unfair or discriminatory practice for
any person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to
discharge any employee, or to otherwise
discriminate in employment against any
applicant for employment or any employ-
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ee because of the age, race, creed, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or disability
of such applicant or employee.”10
Person, as used in the ICRA, “means
one or more individuals, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, and the
state of Iowa and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof.”11
The ICRA also states that “[i]t shall
be an unfair or discriminatory practice
for: (1) Any person to intentionally aid,
abet, compel, or coerce another person
to engage in any of the practices
declared unfair or discriminatory by this
chapter. (2) Any person to discriminate
or retaliate against another person in
any of the rights protected against discrimination by this chapter because such
person has lawfully opposed any practice
forbidden under this chapter, obeys the
provisions of this chapter, or has filed a
complaint, testified, or assisted in any
proceeding under this chapter.”12
Finally, the ICRA’s relief mechanism,
section 216.15, provides that “[a]ny
person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or unfair practice may . . .
file with the [civil rights] commission
a . . . complaint which shall state the
name and address of the person [or]
employer . . . alleged to have committed
the discriminatory or unfair practice of
which complained.”13
As seen by the ICRA’s clear
language, a discrimination claim can
be brought under the ICRA against
any person or employer who discriminates in an employment context. The
ICRA simply does not require the
person to be an employer. In fact,
the ICRA expressly distinguishes
between person and employer throughout the statute. The ICRA separately
defines person and employer, revealing
that person and employer are two
distinct terms.14 As discussed above,
a number of sections apply to persons.
Similarly, the ICRA also has sections
that apply to employers.15
As the Iowa Supreme Court said, rules
of statutory construction should “be
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applied only when the explicit terms of a
statute are ambiguous.”16 In the ICRA’s
case, the Iowa Legislature chose to use
both person and employer. Person and
employer can, in no way, be read to mean
exactly the same thing.17 Therefore, the
use of the term person in Iowa Code section 216.6(1)(a) does not, and cannot,
mean employer as used in the statute.
Although it sounds redundant and even
patronizing, the term person means person as defined in the statute.
When the term person is used in the
statute, as opposed to employer, the legislature’s clear intent is that it meant to
use person, as opposed to employer. As
the Iowa Supreme Court has said, “The
express mention of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of others.”18 When
the Iowa Legislature used the term person in sections 216.2(11), 216.6(1),
216.11 and 216.15, instead of the term
employer, which was used elsewhere in
the statute, we must interpret the statute
based on that usage.19
The Iowa Supreme Court stated that
“it is not the province of the court to
speculate as to probable legislative intent
without regard to the wording used in
the statute, and any determination must
be based upon what the legislature actually said, rather than what it might or
should have said.”20 Although one could
most certainly presume that the Iowa
Legislature intended to hold only
employers liable for employment discrimination – as Title VII does – the
Iowa Legislature did not enact legislation that said so.
Finally, the ICRA itself mandates
that it “shall be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.”21 Similarly, the
Iowa Supreme Court has said to “look to
the object to be accomplished and the
evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied in reaching a reasonable or liberal
construction which will best effect its
purpose rather than one which will
defeat it.”22
This statutory construction principle,
along with the ICRA’s own rule of construction and plain language, cries out for
individual liability. If person were interpreted to mean employer and supervisors
were not held individually liable under
the ICRA, then the net result of such an
interpretation would be an extremely
narrow and restrictive construction of

the ICRA. Clearly, this would violate
cardinal rules of statutory construction
and rupture the ICRA’s own plain language and rule of construction.
If the ICRA’s goal is to stamp out
employment discrimination, how best
could the Iowa Legislature accomplish this
goal? As seen from the ICRA’s plain language, providing a remedy against those
individuals who actually discriminate
would effectuate the ICRA’s purposes far
easier than attempting to use agency principles to hold the employer liable.23
The Stumbling Block
The biggest stumbling block to correctly deciding whether supervisors can
be individually liable under the ICRA
has been an over-reliance on Title VII.
A simple reading of Title VII alongside
the ICRA reveals that the two statutes
simply do not say, and thus cannot
mean, the same thing when addressing
the issue of supervisor liability.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it an “unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”24
Title VII defines employer as “a
person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more
employees . . . and any agent of such
a person.”25
Title VII defines person as including
“one or more individuals, . . . partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, . . . trusts, . . . trustees, .
. . or receivers.”26
Thus, only employers can be held
liable for employment discrimination
under Title VII’s plain language. Unlike
the ICRA, Title VII’s plain language
simply does not answer the question of
whether a supervisory employee can be
held individually liable for employment
discrimination, though. The reason is
Congress’ use of the phrase “any agent of
such a person” when defining employer.
Thus, the debate has raged over whether
Congress was simply codifying respondeat
superior in Title VII or whether it
intended to hold supervisory employees
individually liable.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has

not ruled on whether individuals can be
held liable under Title VII, the vast
majority of federal courts to hear the
question have decided that supervisory
employees are not liable under Title VII.
Given this backdrop of federal litigation under Title VII, Iowa federal district
courts encountered litigation over
whether supervisory employees can be
held individually liable for employment
discrimination under the ICRA.29 As
seen in Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, Judge Celeste
F. Bremer, compared Title VII and its use
of the term employer with the ICRA
and its use of the term person.30
Notwithstanding the glaring differences
between the two statutes, the Court
allowed itself to use Title VII as strong
guidance for interpreting the ICRA.
Another Title VII section may also be
contributing to the over-reliance on federal law when interpreting the ICRA.
As quoted above, Title VII contains a
small-business exclusion for employers
with fewer than fifteen employees.31 The
ICRA also contains a small-business
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Supervisors individually liable
. . . Continued from page 23
exclusion, somewhat similar to that
found in Title VII. Specifically, the
unfair employment practices section
(section 216.6) states that the section
“shall not apply to any employer who
regularly employs less than four individuals.”32 Even though the two statutes
both have small-business exclusions, the
application of the ICRA’s small-business
exclusion should in no way depend on
the application of Title VII’s small-business exclusion.
On the issue of the small-business
exclusions, the ICRA differs substantially from Title VII. Title VII states that
only employers can be held liable for
employment discrimination. On the
other hand, the ICRA makes a clear distinction between employers and persons
and allows complaints to be made
against both employers and persons.
Title VII’s small-business exclusion is
contained in the definition of employer
itself. The ICRA’s small-business exclusion is not contained in any definitions.
And, of course, the ICRA contains no
“small-person” exclusion.
It is important to note that the ICRA’s
small-business exclusion is not found in
the remedies section that authorizes
claims by any aggrieved person against the
person or employer guilty of the discrimination. The ICRA’s small-business exclusion is found only in section 216.6, the
unfair employment practices section, and
states that it applies only to that section,
not the entire chapter. Therefore, the
small-business exclusion does not prohibit
complaints under section 216.15 against
persons, which includes supervisors. The
term employer is used in section
216.6(1)(c), while the term person is used
in section 216.6(1)(a). Because employer
is only used in section 216.6(1)(c) and
not in section 216.6(1)(a), the small-business exclusion simply cannot apply to section 216.6(1)(a) because the exclusion
applies only to employers, not persons. In
addition, the small-business exclusion
cannot apply to the remedies section
(216.15) because the exclusion explicitly
states that it applies only to section 216.6.
Title VII substantially differs from the
ICRA when individual liability is the
issue. In addition, Title VII substantially
24
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differs from the ICRA in the application
of the small-business exclusion. Using
Title VII as guidance when analyzing
either issue makes little sense.33
Although the courts have not relied on
the small-business exclusion as a reason
to hold that individuals cannot be held
liable under the ICRA for employment
discrimination, the courts should make
sure that they do not use Title VII as
guidance when interpreting the ICRA’s
use of the small-business exclusion.
The bottom line is that Title VII’s
small-business exclusion should never be
used to wrongly interpret the ICRA’s
small-business exclusion. Over-reliance
on Title VII should not continue to be a
stumbling block to correctly deciding
cases under the ICRA.
The Confusion
In addition to the confusion caused
by relying on Title VII at the expense of
the ICRA’s plain language, the earliest
problem began in 1991 when the Court
said regarding Iowa Code section
601A.6(1)(a)34: “Obviously, only the
employer, and not third parties, can discharge an employee. Moreover, we hold
that the language “otherwise discriminate in employment” pertains only to
employers. Therefore, acts of third parties are not “unfair or discriminatory
practices” for purposes of section
601A.16(1), and actions against such
third parties are not preempted by chapter 601A.”35 Although the Court
seemed to transform the ICRA’s use of
the term person into the use of the term
employer, the Court apparently wanted
to save an otherwise time-barred complaint from being preempted as an
untimely civil rights claim.
In a 1997 case, the Court again discussed the use of the term person in the
ICRA. This time the Court said that
the use of the term person instead of
employer “extends the prohibition of the
[discriminatory] act to some situations in
which a person guilty of discriminatory
conduct is not the actual employer of
the person discriminated against.”36
Once the Court noted the difference
between person and employer and stopped
relying on Title VII on this issue, the
ICRA’s plain language started to shine

through brightly. Now that the Court
has issued its Vivian opinion, supervisors
can be held individually liable for their
discriminatory acts under Iowa Code
section 216.6(1)(a).
The Aftermath
Now that the question of whether
only employers can be held liable under
the ICRA has been answered, litigation
may expand to include lawsuits against
individual employees. In addition, I
believe we also may see employment discrimination suits against employers with
fewer than four employees because the
ICRA’s small-business exclusion does not
apply to section 216.6(1)(a) or section
216.15, the remedies section. As the
term person includes partnerships, associations and corporations, an unfair
employment practice under section
216.6(1)(a) by one of these entities –
even if they employ less than four
employees – can result in an employment discrimination suit against them
under section 216.15. The small-business exclusion, as written, simply does
not apply to these situations.
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